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Abstract
This paper quantifies the effects of the increasing maximum unem-
ployment insurance (UI) duration during recessions on the drop in the
correlation between output and labour productivity in the U.S. since the
early 1980’s - the so-called productivity puzzle. Using a general equi-
librium search and matching model with stochastic UI duration, hetero-
geneous match quality, variable search intensity and on-the-job search, I
demonstrate that the model can explain over 40 percent of the drop in this
correlation (28 percent when the Great Moderation is taken into account).
More generous UI extensions during recent recessions cause workers to
be more selective with job offers and lower job search effort. The former
channel raises the overall productivity in bad times. The latter prolongs
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1 Introduction/Motivation
The labour productivity has become significantly less procyclical in the U.S.
since the early 1980’s. In particular, the cross correlation between output and
labour productivity has fallen from 0.70 in the 1948-1985 period to only around
0.30 thereafter.1 This change in the procyclicality of the labour productivity is
usually coined “the labour productivity puzzle”. Moreover, it can be observed
that the fall in the correlation between output and labour productivity mostly
happened right after recessionary periods since the 1980’s as depected in Figure
2.
This paper explores the hypothesis that the fall in the procyclicality of labour
productivity is related to the systematic change in the generosity of the U.S. un-
employment insurance (UI) system. One distinctive feature of its UI system is
the extension of the maximum UI duration that is triggered when the unemploy-
ment rate is above a certain threshold making the policy countercyclical. While
the standard UI duration is 26 weeks, the extended UI duration has increased
from the average of 52 weeks during 1948-1985 to 78 weeks after 1985.2
This increase in the generosity of the UI duration during the times of high
unemployment, often associated with recessions, weakens the links between
output and output per worker via two channels. First, a generous UI policy
raises the worker’s outside option, making the workers become more selective
with respect to the quality of job offers; as a result, an upward pressure on the
labour productivity can be expected during the recessions. Second, UI exten-
sions lower job search effort of the unemployed causing a slower job-worker
matching and more persistent unemployment which further prolongs the exten-
sions themselves. With the UI extensions being more generous in the post-1985
period, the UI effect on the labour productivity is expected to be stronger in
recent recessions than in earlier ones. This contributes to the fall in the pro-
cyclicality of labour productivity.
1This change in the correlation is depicted in Figure 1.
2Figure 3 summarises this increasing generosity of the UI duration policy in the U.S.
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I extend the Mortensen-Pissarides general equilibrium search and matching
model to incorporate stochastic UI duration, heterogeneous match quality, vari-
able search intensity and on-the-job search. To my knowledge, this paper is the
first to realistically incorporate the feature where UI extensions are a function of
the unemployment rate which is the case in the U.S.. The cyclical behaviour of
the average match quality is vital in explaining the correlation between output
and output per worker in the model. By allowing for variable search intensity, I
can separately identify the contributions of the two proposed channels, namely,
match formation and job search effort, on the fluctuations in the labour produc-
tivity over the business cycle. Lastly, searching on the job is allowed so that the
model produces a realistic correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
I find that the countercyclical UI policy can account for 43 percent of the
drop in the contemporaneous correlation between output and labour productiv-
ity observed in the U.S. data. By isolating the contributions of the two channels,
I find that both match formations and job search effort have a significant ex-
planatory power over the correlation between output and labour productivity.
By shutting down one channel, the other can explain around half of the drop in
the correlation that the model can produce. Additionally, the model generates
realistic moments of key labour market variables in the U.S., including the share
of insured unemployed workers over the business cycle.
As a robustness check, I extend to the model to take into account the Great
Moderation, the phenomenon where there is a reduction in the macroeconomic
volatility also starting around the mid 1980’s. The decreased volatility does re-
duce the impact of the generous UI extensions because it implies less extreme
negative shocks that can trigger UI extensions; however, the overall UI effect
is still significant and explains around 28 percent of the drop in the procycli-
cality of the labour productivity. Lastly, I show that the model can generate
the downward-sloping duration-dependent job finding probability that is qual-
itatively similar to the data despite the fact that unemployment duration is not
modelled explicitly. This is due to different job finding rates amongst the unem-
ployed.
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I am not the first to investigate the source of the decline in the correlation
between output and labour productivity. Galı´ and van Rens (2014) suggest that
decreasing employment adjustment costs have generated a substantial fall in the
procyclicality of the labour productivity. Berger (2018) explains the puzzle us-
ing a quantitative model with the countercyclical restructuring of firms where
lower-quality workers are more likely to be shed during recessions, and this oc-
curs more often in recent times due to the decreasing labour union power. Garin,
Pries and Sims (2016) use a model with aggregate and island-specific shocks as
well as complete markets, and show that the falling correlation between out-
put and labour productivity is from the relatively lower importance of aggregate
shocks. McGrattan and Prescott (2012) also study the sources of the labour
productivity puzzle by considering intangible capital and sectoral productivity
shocks. The source of the labour productivity puzzle in this paper, namely, UI
extensions, can be directly verified from the data, and this hypothesis is also
supported by existing literature on UI extensions.
There are a number of studies showing significant effects of changes in the
UI policy on macroeconomic variables including the labour productivity and
wages. From a theoretical perspective, Acemoglu and Shimer (2000) show that
an increase in both the duration and the level of UI benefits can increase labour
productivity and wages in a model with risk aversion and precautionary sav-
ings. Marimon and Zilibotti (1999), using a search and matching model with
risk-neutral agents and two-sided heterogeneity, show that a positive replace-
ment rate with unlimited UI duration also leads to a higher labour productivity
when compared to the case without UI. This paper extends from Acemoglu
and Shimer (2000) and Marimon and Zilibotti (1999) by allowing for stochastic
aggregate productivity so that the business cycle properties of the model, partic-
ularly the co-movement between labour productivity and output, can be studied.
Furthermore, there are empirical results that support the hypothesis in this pa-
per. Findings from Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) suggest that a higher UI ben-
efit level has a positive impact on re-employment wages. Caliendo, Tatsiramos
and Uhlendorff (2013) find that a longer UI duration increases re-employment
wages, match quality and match stability.
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It is useful to compare the model in this paper, particularly the UI duration
policy, with that in Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) who study the effects of
maximum UI duration in the U.S. on jobless recoveries3, and Faig, Zhang and
Zhang (2012) who study the contribution of countercyclical UI duration policy
on the labour market dynamics. Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) assume all UI
extensions are unexpected and perceived to last forever by the agents. Although
the model in this paper may not be able to replicate exactly the timing of UI ex-
tensions like in theirs, it can match quite well most of the characteristics in the
labour markets usually associated with the UI duration policy whilst preserving
the agents’ rational expectation. I assume the UI duration policy varies with
the unemployment rate instead of the aggregate total factor productivity like in
Faig et al. (2012). Whilst this offers a more accurate length of UI extensions
(since unemployment tends to be more persistent than does the total factor pro-
ductivity), the model is computationally more difficult to solve since the entire
distribution of workers by employment status and heterogeneous match qual-
ity becomes a state variable. I provide an algorithm that solves the model and
delivers results with high accuracy.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section
3 discusses the calibration exercise. Section 4 analyses the results. Section 5
concludes.
2 Model
2.1 Setup
The model is based on the Mortensen-Pissarides general equilibrium search
and matching model with the incorporation of aggregate productivity shocks,
stochastic UI duration, heterogeneous match quality, variable search intensity
and on-the-job search. Time is discrete and of monthly frequency. Search is
assumed to be random. There is a continuum of workers of measure one and
a larger continuum of firms each with either zero or one employee. They are
3In Mitman and Rabinovich (2015), they also study the optimal UI policy where unemployed
workers can vary their job search intensity. Since matches in this paper differ by match qualities,
I also allow for on-the-job search.
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infinitely-lived and risk-neutral, and they discount future utility flows or profits
each period by a constant factor β ∈ (0,1).
2.1.1 Production
Production Function The production technology of a worker-firm match in
period t with match quality m is
ym,t = ztm
where ym,t is the output the match produces, and zt is the total factor productivity
(TFP). The price of ym,t is normalised to unity.
Match Quality By assumption, variations in the labour productivity in this
model only come from the changes in the average match quality given the ag-
gregate state. This match-specific productivity drawn at the start of any worker-
firm relationship is distributed according to a Beta distribution with parameters
{β1,β2}. The distribution function is
F(m) = m+Betacdf(m−m,β1,β2)
where m > 0 is the lowest productivity level, and 1+m is the highest. Each
match-specific productivity m will remain until the match is either destroyed
(with probability δ ) or hit by a shock that causes the match to redraw m from
F(m) (with probability λ ) in each period.
Aggregate Productivity Shocks There is only one exogenous aggregate shock
in the model which is the shock to the total factor productivity, z, whose natural
logarithm has an AR(1) representation with ρz being its AR parameter. Specifi-
cally,
lnzt = ρz lnzt−1+ εt
where εt is normally and independently distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σz > 0,∀t.
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2.1.2 Workers
Workers maximise the expected discounted lifetime utility
E0
∞
∑
t=0
β t
[
ct−ν(st)
]
where Et(·) is the expectation operator conditional on period-t information, ct
is consumption and ν(·) is the disutility of job search effort st which can be
exerted during both unemployment and employment. Workers can be in one
of the three states: employed (e) unemployed with UI (uUI), and unemployed
without UI (uUU ).
An employed worker in period t with match-specific quality m works and re-
ceives wage wm,t from her matched firm. She searches on the job with intensity
sem,t that costs disutility of νe(sem,t) = ae · (sem,t)1+de where ae and de are positive
constants. At the end of the period: (i) her current match is exogenously de-
stroyed with probability δ in which case she becomes unemployed immediately,
(ii) her match-specific productivity for t+1 is redrawn from a time-invariant dis-
tribution F(m) with probability λ , (iii) she meets a vacant firm with probability
p(sem,t) ≡ pem,t , draws a new match quality m and decides whether to stay with
her current firm, and (iv) the wage is renegotiated for the production next period.
If becoming unemployed in t+1, an employed worker in period t is eligible for
UI benefits in period t + 1 with probability (1−ψ) ∈ (0,1]. (1−ψ) can be
smaller than one to reflect how some newly unemployed workers are ineligible
for or do not claim UI benefits.4 The employed can always exit employment if
desired at the end of period t.
The aggregate states variables in this economy are {z,u,uUI,uUU ,em;∀m}.
Respectively, they are the total factor productivity, the unemployment rate, the
insured unemployment rate, the uninsured unemployment rate and the measure
of employed workers in every level of match quality. I let ω denote this set of
state variables. Given the recursive nature of the problem, the time subscripts
are dropped and variables with superscript ′ are of the next period. Variables
4In the U.S., the average ratio of the insured unemployed to the total unemployed is 36%
between 1967-2014.
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with subscripts m and/or ω depend on the match-specific productivity and/or
the set of aggregate state variables. Eω ′|ω [·] is the mathematical expectation
operator over the distribution of ω ′|ω . Em[·] is similarly defined but taken over
the invariant distribution of m, F(m).
Given ω , an employed worker with match quality m and last period’s employ-
ment status j ∈ {e,UI,UU} has the following value function:
W j(m;ω) = max
se(m;ω)
w j(m;ω)︸ ︷︷ ︸
wage
−νe(se(m;ω))︸ ︷︷ ︸
disutility from job search
+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(match survives, same m)
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(no job-to-job transition)
W e+(m;ω ′)
+ pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(make job-to-job transition)
Em′|m′>m[W e+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(match survives, changing m)
Em′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(no job-to-job transition)
W e+(m′;ω ′)
+ pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(make job-to-job transition)
Em′′|m′′>m′[W e+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
+ δ︸︷︷︸
Pr(match destroyed)
(
(1−ψ)UUI(ω ′)+ψUUU(ω ′)
)]
(1)
where W e+(m;ω ′)≡max{W e(m;ω ′),(1−ψ)UUI(ω ′)+ψUUU(ω ′)} showing
that, conditional on the match not being exogenously destroyed, an employed
worker can choose to either remain employed in the next period and receive the
valueW e(·; ·)5 or return to unemployment and risk not having UI benefits (which
occurs at rate ψ). Last period’s employment status j ∈ {e,UI,UU} matters for
the workers as it represents the outside option they have when negotiating for
wages. UUI(ω) and UUU(ω) are the values of being insured and uninsured
unemployed respectively. pe(m;ω) is the probability that an employed worker
whose current match quality is m meets a vacant firm which depends on her
search intensity se(m;ω). δ and λ are respectively the match destruction prob-
5The valueW e(·; ·) for the next period can vary depending on whether the worker-firm match
has to redraw its match quality and whether the worker makes a job-to-job transtion.
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ability and the probability that the match redraws its match quality. The ex-
pression for the optimal search intensity for employed workers can be found in
Appendix B.
An insured unemployed worker in period t receives UI benefits b and leisure
flow h.6 She also exerts job search effort sUIt that comes with a disutility cost
of νu(sUIt ) = au · (sUIt )1+du where au and du are positive constants. She meets a
vacant firm with probability p(sUIt ) ≡ pUIt . A new worker-firm match draws a
match-specific productivity for their production in t+1 from the time-invariant
distribution F(m). They can dissolve the match and return to the unemploy-
ment/vacancy pool if the draw is not good enough. An insured unemployed
worker in t who fails to be employed in t + 1 loses her UI eligibility in t + 1
with probability φ(ut) where ut is the unemployment rate at the beginning of t.
Since the inverse of φ(ut) is the expected duration of being able to receive UI, I
use this function to control for the maximum UI duration that changes with the
unemployment rate (as in the case in the U.S.). The properties of φ(ut) will be
discussed in more detail in the next subsection.7 Insured unemployed workers
that meet a firm but decide to remain unemployed and continue to search for a
job may additionally lose UI eligibility with probability ξ .8 This parameter can
be greater than zero to reflect the job search monitoring in UI recipients.
For an uninsured unemployed worker, the setting is analogous except she
does not receive the UI benefits b and when failing to become employed she
simply remains unemployed without UI. She also exerts job search effort sUUt
that comes at the utility cost of νu(sUUt ) = au(sUUt )1+du , and she meets a vacant
firm with probability p(sUUt )≡ pUUt .
6This flow h can be interpreted as the value of leisure, home production, food stamps, etc.
7This setting for the UI duration policy, first used in Fredriksson and Holmlund (2001), helps
reduce the state space greatly.
8The effective probability of an insured unemployed worker being eligible for UI next period
given she turns down a match formation is therefore (1−φ(ut))(1−ξ ).
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The Bellman equations for the insured and uninsured unemployed workers
can be written as, respectively:
UUI(ω) = max
sUI(ω)
b+h−νu(sUI(ω))+β pUI(ω)Em′ω ′|ω
[
max
{
WUI(m′;ω ′),
(1−φ(u))(1−ξ )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(UI eligible|turn down a firm)
UUI(ω ′)+
(
φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(UI ineligible|turn down a firm)
UUU(ω ′)
}]
+β (1− pUI(ω))Eω ′|ω
[
(1−φ(u))︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(UI eligible|no meeting)
UUI(ω ′)+φ(u)UUU(ω ′)
]
(2)
UUU(ω) = max
sUU (ω)
h−νu(sUU(ω))
+β pUU(ω)Em′ω ′|ω
[
max
{
WUU(m′;ω ′),UUU(ω ′)
}]
+β (1− pUU(ω))Eω ′|ω [UUU(ω ′)] (3)
where pUI(ω) is the probability that an insured unemployed worker meets a
vacant firm which depends on her search intensity sUI(ω), and pUU(ω) is anal-
ogously defined. We can see from equation (2) that, for insured unemployed
workers, the outside option for those meeting a vacant firm is smaller than for
those not meeting a vacant firm, i.e. (1−φ(u))(1− ξ ) < φ(u) and UUI(ω) >
UUU(ω). This is due to the possibility of being UI ineligible after turning down
a job offer. Note that if the UI exhaustion rate becomes unity, i.e. no one is
insured unemployed, there will be no difference between equations (2) and (3).
The expressions for the optimal search intensities for insured and uninsured un-
employed workers can be found in Appendix B.
2.1.3 UI Duration Policy: φ(ut)
Empirically, there are three main categories of UI duration policy in the U.S.:
(i) the standard UI duration of 26 weeks, (ii) the automatic extension programme
that is triggered by the state unemployment rate (either total, insured or both)
called “Extended Benefits (EB)” programme which extends UI further by 13-20
weeks, and (iii) the ad-hoc programmes that are often issued in the recessions
and also triggered by the state unemployment rate providing additional UI rang-
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ing from 13 to 53 weeks. To capture these features, I combine the extensions
in (ii) and (iii) together and make them a function of the unemployment rate u.9
Specifically, φ(u) can take one of the two values: a low value which implies a
longer UI duration for the recessionary episodes and a high value for the normal
time. There is a threshold unemployment rate u¯ such that whenever u ≥ u¯, the
maximum UI duration increases, and φ(u) takes the low value φL, and whenever
u< u¯, the maximum UI duration remains standard at 26 weeks, and φ(u) takes
the high value φH where 0 < φL < φH < 1. In summary,
φ(ut) = φL1{ut ≥ u¯}+φH1{ut < u¯}; ∀t
I assume this UI duration policy φ(u) is known to all agents; therefore, they
expect a longer UI duration when the unemployment rate is expected to exceed
u¯.10 That is, agents have a rational expectation about the timings of UI exten-
sions. In order to finance UI benefits, the government collects lump sum tax τt
from all firms that are in production. The tax is set to satisfy the government
budget constraint in each period. Namely,
τt =
buUIt
1−ut ; ∀t
2.1.4 Firms
Firms maximise the expected discounted profits. They are matched with ei-
ther one or zero worker. A firm in operation (matched with a worker) in period t
sells output ym,t , pays wage wm,t to the worker and pays lump sum tax τt . Analo-
gous to an employed worker, it faces an exogenous match-destruction shock and
a shock to redraw its match-specific productivity (at rate δ and λ respectively).
Further, it becomes unmatched when its worker takes up a new job offer.11 The
9This is the reason why the unemployment rate is a state variable for the policy functions and
so is the composition of employed and unemployed workers due to the endogenous destruction
margin.
10As explained in Appendix A, some UI extensions are not anticipated per se but due to the
fact that the U.S. government has always issued ad-hoc UI extensions during the recessions, it
can be argued that in reality agents expect these additional ad-hoc UI extensions around reces-
sionary periods (particularly with a high unemployment rate), just not exactly when the policy
is implemented.
11The probability that this event happens depends on the match-specific productivity they will
have at the start of next period.
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producing firm can walk away from the match if desired at the end of period.
Let J j denote the value of a filled job given its worker’s employment status
last period j ∈ {e,UI,UU}, and V the value of posting a vacancy. The Bellman
equation for an operating firm is
J j(m;ω) = y(m;ω)−w j(m;ω)− τ(ω)+βEω ′|ω
[
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Je+(m;ω ′)
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Je+(m′;ω ′)
]
+δV (ω ′)
]
(4)
where Je+(m;ω ′) ≡ max{Je(m;ω ′),V (ω ′)} showing that the firm can freely
choose to either remain with its current worker and receive Je(m;ω ′) or become
unmatched and receive V (ω ′) in the next period.
A vacant firm pays a flow cost of κ each period to post a vacancy. It meets a
worker with probability qt , and together they draw a match-specific productivity
for t+1 and decide whether to continue with the production. It cannot directly
choose the type(s) of workers to meet and therefore needs to take into account
the distribution of workers over the employment status and, if employed, match-
specific productivity as well as their search effort. I assume that the free entry
condition holds which means that the value of a vacant firm is always zero, i.e.
V (ω) = 0,∀ω .
The value of posting a vacancy is
V (ω) = −κ+βq(ω)Eω ′|ω
[
∑
m
ζ e(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[Je+(m′;ω ′)]
+ζUI(ω)Em′[JUI+(m′;ω ′)]+ζUU(ω)Em′[JUU+(m′;ω ′)]
]
(5)
where ζ ’s represent the probability that a vacant firm meets a certain type of
worker by employment status and, if the worker is currently employed, match
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quality given that a worker-firm meeting takes place. Particularly,
ζ e(m) =
(1−λ )semem+λ f (m)see
see+ sUIuUI+ sUUuUU
; see=∑
m
semem
ζUI =
sUIuUI
see+ sUIuUI+ sUUuUU
; ζUU =
sUUuUU
see+ sUIuUI+ sUUuUU
2.1.5 Meeting Function
The meeting function M(st ,vt) takes the aggregate search intensity st and the
number of job vacancies vt in period t as inputs and gives a number of meetings
between workers and firms as output.12 The function has constant returns to
scale, and it is increasing and concave in its arguments. In particular, I assume:13
M(st ,vt) =
stvt(
slt + vlt
) 1
l
(6)
Let θt = vt/st denote the market tightness. The worker’s meeting rate per
search unit is M(st ,vt)/st =M(1,θt)which I also call the conditional job finding
rate per search unit since a positive match surplus is required for a job to be
created. The conditional job finding rate for an unemployed worker of type
i ∈ {UI,UU} is thus sitM(1,θt) = pit . Analogously, it is sem,tM(1,θt) = pem,t for
an employed worker with match quality m. The conditional job filling rate for a
vacant firm is M(st ,vt)/vt =M(1/θt ,1) = qt .
2.2 Wage and Match Surplus
Wages are negotiated at the end of each period after the match quality for the
next period is realised. They are determined using a generalised Nash bargaining
rule. The bargaining power of a worker is µ ∈ (0,1) and that of a firm is 1−µ .
Given the match quality and the aggregate state variables (m;ω), the generalised
Nash bargaining rule implies three different wages depending on the worker’s
employment status last period j ∈ {e,UI,UU} due to their different outside
12st is the sum of aggregate search intensity of employed and unemployed workers in time t.
13This matching function is similar to the one introduced by den Haan, Ramey and Watson
(2000) with an addition of the variable search intensity.
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options. Namely,
w j(m;ω) = argmax
(
WS j(m;ω)
)µ(
J j(m;ω)
)(1−µ)
(7)
where WS j is the surplus from working for type- j employed workers which are
as follows:
WSe(m;ω) = W e(m;ω)− (1−ψ)UUI(ω)−ψUUU(ω)
WSUI(m;ω) = WUI(m;ω)− (1−φ(u))(1−ξ )UUI(ω)
−(φ(u)+(1−φ(u))ξ )UUU(ω)
WSUU(m;ω) = WUU(m;ω)−UUU(ω)
We can see from here that workers with different status j have different
outside options because they face different probabilities of being able to receive
UI in case they walk away from the negotiation.14 Further, the total match
surplus (or joint surplus) of a worker-firm match given the worker’s previous
employment status j ∈ {e,UI,UU} can be defined as
S j(m;ω) = WS j(m;ω)+ J j(m;ω)
The firm’s surplus from being matched with a worker is simply the value of
being matched with a worker (J) itself because of the free entry condition. The
expressions for these employment-history-dependent surpluses can be found in
Appendix B. With the Nash bargaining rule, we have
WS j(m;ω) = µS j(m;ω) (8)
J j(m;ω) = (1−µ)S j(m;ω) (9)
Therefore, both the worker and the firm always agree it is profitable to form a
match if and only if their total match surplus is positive, i.e. S j(m;ω)> 0.
14Note that, for employed workers, I assume that their outside option is to return to unem-
ployment and not remaining in the current match. This assumption is made for simplicity as
otherwise the entire history of match qualities of an employed worker will become a state vari-
able.
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2.3 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of value functions, W e(m;ω),
WUI(m;ω), WUU(m;ω), UUI(ω), UUU(ω), Je(m;ω), JUI(m;ω), JUU(m;ω),
and V (ω); market tightness θ(ω); search policy se(m;ω), sUI(ω) and sUU(ω);
and wage functions we(m;ω), wUI(m;ω), and wUU(m;ω), such that, given the
initial distribution of workers over the employment status and match productiv-
ity, the government’s policy τ(ω) and φ(ω) and the law of motion for z:
1. The value functions and the market tightness satisfy the Bellman equa-
tions for workers and firms and the free entry condition, namely, equations
(1), (2), (3), (4) and (5)
2. The search decisions satisfy the FOCs for optimal search intensity which
are equations (16), (17) and (18)
3. The wage functions satisfy the FOCs for the generalised Nash bargaining
rule (equation (7))
4. The government’s budget constraint is satisfied each period
5. The distribution of workers evolves according to the transition equations
(19), (20) and (21), which can be found in Appendix C, consistent with
the maximising behaviour of agents.
2.4 Solving the Model
In order to compute the market tightness (and, in effect, total match surpluses
and search effort) in the model, the agents in the economy need to keep track
of the distribution of workers over the employment status and match quality
{em ∀m,uUI,uUU} as they enter the vacancy creation condition (equation (5)).
In order to predict next-period unemployment rate, they need to know the inflow
to and outflow from unemployment which are based on this distribution. I use
the Krusell & Smith (1998) algorithm to predict the laws of motion for both
the insured unemployment rate and the total unemployment rate as a function
of current unemployment rate (u) and TFP shock (z). As the distribution of
employed workers by match quality does not vary much over time, I use the
stochastic steady state distributions as its proxy. I report the performance of this
approximation in Appendix D.
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3 Calibration
I estimate a subset of the parameters by matching key statistics of the U.S.
economy, particularly its labour market. To obtain the counterparts of these
statistics from the model, I solve for the policy functions and simulate an econ-
omy for T periods where T is large and repeat for 1,000 times. In each simula-
tion, I split the pre- and post-1985 periods at T1 where 1 < T1 < T and compute
relevant statistics including the correlations between output and labour produc-
tivity for these two periods.15
In the simulation, the only difference between pre- and post-1985 periods is
the UI duration policy φ(u). Specifically, I allow for an increase in its generosity
during recessions from pre- to post-1985 periods. As a result, there are two
UI duration regimes. When u < u¯, the maximum UI duration is six months
(standard) in both regimes; however, when u ≥ u¯, the maximum UI duration is
extended to be in total of:
1. Twelve months from period 1 to T1 representing January 1948 to March
1985 (the average extended UI duration during the pre-1985 period)
2. Eighteen months from T1 + 1 to T representing April 1985 to June 2014
(the average extended UI duration during the post-1985 period).
Table 2 summarises all the pre-specified parameters while Table 3 describes
the calibrated parameters in the model.
Discretisation I discretise the total factor productivity (z) using Rouwenhorst
(1995)’s method to approximate an AR(1) process with a finite-state Markov
chain. I use 51 nodes to solve the model and 5,100 nodes by linear interpolation
in the simulations.
Similarly, I use 51 equidistant nodes to approximate the Beta distribution of
the match-specific productivity F(m) when solving the model and 5,100 nodes
by linear interpolation in the simulations. I define f (m) to be F ′(m)/∑mF ′(m)
where F ′(m) is the probability density function of F(m).
15Specifically, T is 5,320 and T1 is 2,980 so that they are proportional to the data used in this
paper. Additionally, I include 200 burn-in periods.
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3.1 Pre-specified Parameters
The pre-specified parameters in the model are summarised in Table 2. For
the discount factor β , I use the value of 0.9967 implying an annual interest
rate of 4% which is the U.S. average. I follow Fujita and Ramey (2012) in
pinning down the vacancy creation cost κ to be 0.0392 using survey evidence
on vacancy durations and hours spent on vacancy posting.16 I assign µ , the
worker’s bargaining power, to be 0.5 following den Haan, Ramey and Watson
(2000).17
φH and φL are the UI exhaustion rates during normal periods and recessions
respectively. I set φH to be 1/6 which implies the standard maximum UI dura-
tion of 6 months given the monthly frequency. The UI exhaustion rates when
UI is extended (u≥ u¯) are set to be φL,pre85 = 1/12 for the pre-1985 period and
φL,post85 = 1/18 for the post-1985 period implying the maximum UI duration
of 12 months (the pre-1985 average) and 18 months (the post-1985 average) re-
spectively. I set u¯, the threshold unemployment rate that triggers UI extensions,
to be 6% which is on the lower bound of the observed UI extension criteria.
To determine the flow values of unemployed workers, h and, if insured, b, I
use the results in Gruber (1997). In particular, he finds the drop in consumption
for the newly unemployed workers is 10% when receiving UI and 24% when not
receiving UI given the replacement rate of 50%. To obtain the values of h and b
given a set of parameters, I first guess the mean wage for the newly unemployed,
set the values of h and b to be 76% and 14% of the guess respectively, and solve
the model to obtain the policy functions. I then simulate the model to check if
the guess is close to the simulated counterpart. If it is not, I replace the guessed
wage for the newly unemployed with the one from the simulation, obtain new
values of h and b and repeat the same process until the two are close enough.
16Fujita and Ramey (2012) find the vacancy cost to be 17% of a 40-hour work week. Normal-
ising the mean productivity to unity, this gives the value of 0.17 per week or 0.0392 per month.
The actual mean productivity may be higher than (but not greatly different from) unity due to
truncation from below of the match-specific quality.
17As a robustness check, I also report the main results with the worker’s bargaining power
being 0.7 as used in Shimer (2005).
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The slope of the search cost function for the unemployed au is normalised
such that the search effort of the uninsured unemployed sUU is unity when the
economy is in the steady state, similar to Nagypa´l (2005). The power parameters
in the search cost functions for both employed and unemployed workers (de and
du) are set to unity in line with Christensen et al. (2005) and Yashiv (2000).
That is, the search cost function is quadratic.
3.2 Calibrated Parameters
I use the simulated method of moments to assign values to the remaining
eleven parameters {l,δ ,λ ,ψ,ξ ,ae,m,β1,β2,ρz,σz} by matching twelve mo-
ments.18 The values of these parameters are reported in Table 3. The targeted
moments used in the calibration are:
• The first and second moments of the unemployment rate, the job destruc-
tion rate and the job finding rate,
• The first moment of the job-to-job transtion rate, the average unemploy-
ment duration and the insured unemployment rate,
• The second moment and the autocorrelation coefficient of the labour pro-
ductivity, and
• The correlation between output and labour productivity during the pre-
1985 period.
I describe the data source in this calibration exercise in Appendix A. The model’s
generated moments are reported in Table 4 along with their empirical counter-
parts. Table 5 shows other related moments not targeted in the calibration. Both
tables also report the results under the case with an alternative worker’s bargain-
ing power (µ = 0.7) as a robustness check.
18The calibrated parameters are to minimise the sum of squared residuals of percentage
changes between the model-generated moments and their empirical counterparts.
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4 Results
4.1 Performance
As shown in Table 4, the baseline model, despite being over-identified, matches
the twelve targeted moments quite well overall including the first moments of
the unemployment rate, the job finding rate, the job destruction rate and the
job-to-job transition rate. It can also match the characteristics of the labour pro-
ductivity quite well. The average job finding rate is somewhat higher than the
data whilst unemployment and job findings exhibit slightly higher fluctuations
than the data. The mean unemployment duration is lower than the data but this
is partly due to the Great Recession period where there was an unprecedented
spike in average duration of unemployment. I will provide the analysis of non-
targeted business cycle moments in the later subsection.
Additionally, I also find the path of TFP shocks that yields a detrended output
series identical to the data (using the parameters in Table 2 and 3). With this
path of TFP shocks, I compare the model-generated series of relevant macroe-
conomic variables to the data. Figure 6 shows that the model produces similar
dynamics of unemployment, job findings and unemployment durations while
job destructions fluctuate too little comparing to the data. It is expected that
the detrended series from the model may be different from the data since low
frequency changes are not accounted for. That being said, the empirical average
unemployment duration is much higher than the model counterpart. However,
the model’s insured unemployment series is close to the data from both the
cyclical and raw-data aspects, as shown in Figure 8 and 9, especially during
recessions when the insured unemployment rate spikes.
4.2 The Correlation Between Output and Labour Productiv-
ity
With respect to the labour productivity puzzle, the model can explain a signifi-
cant part of the drop in the procyclicality of the labour productivity. Particularly,
it can generate over 40 percent of the observed fall in the correlation between
output and labour productivity from pre- to post-1985 periods (a drop from 0.76
to 0.59 as compared to a drop from 0.70 to 0.30) as shown in Table 6. Note that a
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standard search and matching model without any change in the UI duration will
not be able to produce any shift in this correlation since the policy functions will
remain the same in both pre-1985 and post-1985 periods. Despite not targeted,
the overall correlation produced by the model is in fact quite close to the data
(0.65 as compared to 0.62). The model-generated pre-1985 correlation, which
is targeted in the calibration, is slightly higher than that in the data (0.76 as com-
pared to 0.70), and the correlation difference is larger for the post-1985 period
(0.59 as compared to 0.30). The last column in Table 6 shows that the results
remain largely the same when a different parameter for the worker’s bargaining
power is used.
The success of the model in generating a sizeable drop in the correlation is
due to the fall in the UI exhaustion rate during high unemployment (the change
in φL) from the pre-1985 to post-1985 periods which alters the policy functions
in the model: (i) match surplus and (ii) job search effort as a function of unem-
ployment. A smaller φL in the post-1985 period lowers match surpluses, making
worker-firm matches with low match qualities unviable, and lifts up the average
labour productivity during the recessions. At the same time, a smaller φL low-
ers the job search effort and, in effect, employment, thereby prolonging the UI
extensions once triggered.
Match Surplus The discontinuity in the UI duration function φ(u) creates a
discontinuity in the match surplus as a function of unemployment as shown in
Figure 4.19 Whenever unemployment is above the threshold (u ≥ u¯), the func-
tion φ(u) falls from φH to φL. The fall in φ(u) increases the outside option of
workers and decreases the surpluses from working for most workers.20 There-
fore, it is less likely for matches to be/remain formed, especially those with low
match quality m. This puts an upward pressure on the average labour produc-
tivity against negative shocks to z and results in a less-than-perfect correlation
between output and labour productivity. Since φL,post85 < φL,pre85, the post-1985
19The surplus in Figure 4 is plotted for the middle nodes on the grids of match quality m and
aggregate productivity z. The match surplus indeed increases in these two arguments but not in
a discontinuous fashion like in the dimension of unemployment u.
20Specifically, the surpluses of workers with history {e,UI} fall as shown in Figure 4. We can
see that the surplus for workers with history UU , however, increases slightly with lower φ(u)
because it is better for this type of workers to become re-employed and increase the likelihood
of receiving UI in the event that they return to unemployment.
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match surpluses fall even further whenever u≥ u¯ comparing to those in the pre-
1985 period, and only the matches with higher match qualities exist in post-1985
recessions. This means, in the post-1985 period, the positive response of labour
productivity upon a negative shock is stronger and results in a lower correlation
between output and labour productivity compared to the pre-1985 period.
Job Search Effort Similar to the previous argument, the discontinuity in φ(u)
creates a drop in the job search effort and the job finding rate for the insured
unemployed around u¯ where φ(u) falls from φH to φL as seen in Figure 5.
When u ≥ u¯, there are fewer meetings and, as a result, higher unemployment
which feeds back to the UI policy φ(u) to remain low at φL for longer.21 With
φL,post85 < φL,pre85, the post-1985 job search effort fall even further whenever
u≥ u¯ compared to those in pre-1985 periods. Unemployment is thus more likely
to remain high and lengthen the effects the UI extensions have on the falling cor-
relation between output and labour productivity in the post-1985 period.
It is worth noting that the UI effect via the match surplus channel also cap-
tures the responses of vacancy creation and wage negotiation to UI extensions.
For the vacancy creation, since unemployment is a state variable, we can see
from equation (5) and (9) that vacant firms optimally adjust the number of va-
cancies according to the existing match surplus (via the matched firm’s surplus
in equilibrium) left to be split. For the wage channel, any change in the wage
negotiation due to UI extensions also results in a change in the match surplus
according to equation (7), (8) and (9). Therefore, subsequent analyses on the
response of the match surplus will inherently encapsulate responses of vacancy
creation and wage negotiation.
4.3 Impulse Response Functions
The impulse response functions (IRFs) of key variables in the model are use-
ful in demonstrating how the UI duration policy affects the correlation between
output and labour productivity. Figure 10 and 11 show respectively the IRFs
of output (y), labour productivity (LP) and average match quality (E(m)) to 1%
21In this model, the persistence of UI extensions interacts with the persistence of unemploy-
ment which is in line with the hypothesis in Mitman and Rabinovich (2014) where a longer UI
duration increases the persistence of unemployment.
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and 2% negative TFP (z) shocks from its steady state for pre-1985 (solid lines)
and post-1985 (dashed lines) periods.
In the case of a 1% negative deviation, there is not much difference between
the responses of variables in pre- and post-1985 periods because unemployment
does not exceed u¯ and trigger the UI extension. We can see that the labour pro-
ductivity recovers as soon as the shock subsides while output reaches its trough
6 months after the shock hits for both pre- and post-1985 periods. Therefore,
the correlation between output and labour productivity is less than perfect under
a 1% negative TFP shock but there is hardly any difference between pre- and
post-1985 periods.
On the contrary, the IRFs between pre- and post-1985 periods are very differ-
ent when the size of the shock is instead 2% negative deviation from the steady
state. This is solely because the UI extension is triggered for the post-1985 pe-
riod (from the fifth month onwards) but not in the pre-1985 period where the
IRFs are almost identical to the 1% deviation case.22 As discussed in the previ-
ous subsection, an extension of UI tends to raise the overall match quality as can
be seen in Figure 11. The post-1985 average match quality responds positively
throughout once the UI extension is triggered. The labour productivity also be-
haves similarly. Despite its negative response throughout, output per worker
recovers at a faster rate than in the pre-1985 period once UI extension is in
place. More starkly is the response of output that reaches its trough 15 months
after the initial shock, almost one year later than the cases without UI extension
(the pre-1985 period with 2% shock and both pre- and post-1985 periods with
1% shock). The quicker recovery of the labour productivity combined with the
highly persistent negative output response makes the correlation between out-
put and labour productivity in the post-1985 period much smaller than that in
the pre-1985 period.
22If there was no change in the maximum UI duration, Figure 10 and 11 would have looked
identical with only a change in the scale.
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4.4 Decomposition of Countercyclical UI Duration Effects
The increase in the generosity of the UI duration policy affects the procycli-
cality of labour productivity via the responses of match surplus and job search
effort (on top of the increase in the maximum UI duration). In this exercise, I
decompose the effect of the UI extensions to study the contribution of these two
channels.
In the first case, I study the contribution of the job search effort response
(following a more generous UI duration policy) on the falling procyclicality of
the labour productivity. I do this by assuming that both workers and firms use
the pre-1985 match surpluses throughout the simulation to make decisions on
match formation and dissolution (i.e., the policy functions for match surpluses
do not change from pre- to post-1985 periods). Therefore, any change in the
cyclicality of the labour productivity comes from the response of the job search
effort to the increase in the UI generosity. Analogously, in the second case where
I study the contribution of the change in the joint match surpluses, I fix the job
search effort policy functions at the pre-1985 period to measure the impact of the
response of the match surpluses, which is due to the increase in the generosity
of UI duration policy, on the procyclicality of the labour productivity.
It turns out that both job search effort and match surpluses explain a substan-
tial part of the drop in the output-labour-productivity correlation and deliver a
higher overall correlation of 0.72-0.73 as shown in Table 7. It is rather sur-
prising that the search effort channel contributes almost as much as the match
surplus channel to the drop (respectively 50% and 60% of the model’s generated
drop - equivalent to 21% and 25% of the empirical drop) since the search effort
channel only affects the insured unemployed workers whilst the response of the
match surplus affects most workers. This finding shows that in order to obtain a
sizeable shift in the correlation between output and labour productivity, the vari-
able search intensity margin is just as important as the total match surpluses that
workers and firms use to determine match formations and dissolutions. Assum-
ing search effort to be constant can undermine the effect of UI duration policy
on the behaviour of the labour productivity over the business cycles.
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4.5 On the Great Moderation
Since the mid 1980’s, apart from a significant drop in the procyclicality of
the labour productivity, the U.S. economy (among others) also experienced a
substantial reduction in the output volatility. This phenomenon is coined “the
Great Moderation”.23 The Great Moderation can potentially change the effect
of the countercyclical UI duration policy on the labour productivity since the
decreased volatility of the business cycle fluctuations implies that large negative
shocks are less likely to occur after the mid 1980’s and, therefore, high unem-
ployment that triggers UI extensions is less likely to occur.
To quantify how much the Great Moderation can impact the UI effect on the
labour productivity, I introduce a drop in the variance of the aggregate produc-
tivity z from the pre-1985 period to the post-1985 period (σz,pre85 > σz,post85).
I set the difference between the two variances based on the empirical values of
the labour productivity series. Specifically, I compute the ratio of the pre-1985
standard deviation to the overall standard deviation of the detrended labour pro-
ductivity series and multiply it with the calibrated value of the standard deviation
of the aggregate productivity shock σz to get σz,pre85. I do the same for the post-
1985 period to obtain σz,post85. I report the values in Table 2. Based on these
values, I solve the model again where not only the UI duration policy changes
from the pre-1985 to post-1985 periods but the standard deviation of the TFP
shocks also drops from the pre-1985 to post-1985 periods. With the resulting
policy functions (total match surplus and job search effort), I redo the simula-
tion where the Great Moderation is featured and report correlation statistics in
Table 6.
Table 6 shows that the Great Moderation does have a negative impact on the
effect the countercyclical UI policy has on the labour productivity. In particular,
the drop in the correlation between output and labour productivity from pre- to
post-1985 periods is smaller when the volatility of TFP shocks is reduced after
the mid 1980’s (a drop of 0.11 as compared to 0.17 in the baseline case). That
being said, the fall in the procyclicality of the labour productivity is still sizeable
and amounts to 28 percent of the empirical drop in this correlation.
23McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) is amongst the first to document this phenomenon.
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4.6 Other Business Cycle Properties
With regards to related moments that are not targeted (shown in Table 5),
the model does a good job in matching the dynamics of the employment rate
and the insured unemployment rate as well as the cyclicality of unemployment,
job findings and job destructions. The correlation between unemployment and
vacancies is however moderately negative (-0.37) while it is strongly negative
in the data (-0.88).24
Apart from the fall in the procyclicality of labour productivity, the corre-
lations between output and a few labour market variables have also become
somewhat smaller (including the job finding rate, the job separation rate and
vacancies) from the pre-1985 to the post-1985 periods. Without targeting them,
the model can produce these weakened correlations as also shown in Table 5.
Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011) study the correlations between labour pro-
ductivity and labour market variables such as unemployment, vacancies and
labour market tightness. Whilst a standard Mortensen-Pissarides model implies
high values for these correlations, they are much weaker in the data. They ex-
tend the standard model to include a stochastic value of worker’s outside option
(home production) and a time to build a vacancy that help reconcile these dis-
crepancies.25 I can relate the stochastic value of home production to the state-
dependent UI duration in my model since it implies that the outside options of
workers evolve stochastically. As the model is this paper breaks down the tight
link between output and labour productivity, a correlation between labour pro-
ductivity and unemployment (-0.59 as shown in Table 5) is consequently very
close to the data (-0.63) whilst a productivity-driven MP model would imply a
very strong correlation. However, the labour productivity implied by both my
model and that in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011) is somewhat more highly
correlated with the labour market tightness and vacancies than in the data. The
model-implied correlations are nonetheless significantly smaller than one.
24Hagedorn and Manovskii (2011) show that a longer model period emphasises the time
aggregation issues and lowers the correlation between unemployment and vacancies.
25Furthermore, they also show that some of the discrepancies is related to the data being
used. Specifically, if the labour productivity series is constructed using the employment data
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) instead of the Current Employment Statistics (CES),
the correlations between labour productivity and other labour market variables become stronger.
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4.7 Hazard Rate of Exiting Unemployment
Despite the assumption that the unemployment duration is not part of the
state variable, and, therefore, the job finding probability of a worker does not
vary with her unemployment duration, the heterogeneity amongst unemployed
workers in the model still has an implication for the duration-dependent job find-
ing probabilities at the aggregate level. Contrary to a constant unemployment
exit rate in a standard search and matching model (with no participation mar-
gins), the model in this paper can produce a realistic feature of the rate at which
an unemployed worker finds a job by durations of unemployment. Empirically,
this rate is decreasing and usually convex in the time spent in unemployment.
As depicted by Figure 12, the model can replicate these properties.
I present the hazard functions in two cases: (i) the insured unemployed work-
ers remain insured throughout the unemployment spell, and (ii) the insured un-
employed become uninsured with probability φH each period (implying the stan-
dard UI duration during normal times) as these are the lower and upper bounds
for the realised maximum UI durations. The hazard rate is decreasing in the un-
employment duration due to the changing composition of unemployed workers.
Uninsured unemployed workers have a higher job finding rate and therefore exit
unemployment faster than the insured type. With time, unemployed workers
are more represented by the insured type, the exit rate therefore falls with the
unemployment duration and only becomes constant when there is no uninsured
type left in the unemployment pool.
When compared to the data, Kroft, Lange, Notowidigdo and Katz (2016)
have estimated this hazard rate parametrically controlling for observable char-
acteristics from the CPS data between 2002-2007. They find that the relative
job finding rate (normalised to unity at zero duration) drops sharply during the
first 8-10 months after which the rate becomes stable around 0.4-0.5. Their haz-
ard function drops slightly faster than what this model can produce given that
the insured unemployed remain insured throughout the spell (case (i)). How-
ever, when the stochastic UI exhaustion rate is taken into account (case (ii)), the
model can only partially explain the drop in the hazard function during the first
months of unemployment. The model’s true performance lies between these two
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functions as the maximum UI durations can vary between 6 months to almost
2 years. This implies that the heterogeneity in the job finding rates by employ-
ment status can explain only partially the persistence of unemployment and its
duration structure.
5 Conclusion
This paper is set out to quantify how much the increasingly generous UI dura-
tion policy during recessionary periods in the U.S. contributes to the substantial
fall in the procyclicality of its labour productivity over the business cycle. The
results are obtained from a search and matching model with stochastic UI du-
ration, heterogeneous match quality, variable search intensity and on-the-job
search. This model can produce over 40 percent of the empirical drop in the
correlation between output and labour productivity. The countercyclical UI du-
ration policy lowers the total match surpluses in bad times causing matches with
low qualities to be unviable and, therefore, raises the average labour productivity
while output is more negatively affected.
At the same time, this UI policy lowers the job search effort of the insured
unemployed causing unemployment to be more persistent. Thus, it prolongs
the UI extensions themselves and their effect on the correlation between output
and labour productivity (since the UI policy is a function of the unemployment
rate). As the UI duration policy is more generous after 1985, its effect via these
two channels is stronger than that in the pre-1985 period which gives rise to the
falling procyclicality of the labour productivity. A decomposition study shows
that both channels are important in explaining this cyclicality change. Lastly,
the model performs very well in producing key statistics in the labour markets,
especially the insured unemployment rate over the business cycles.
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A Data
Both empirical and simulated (logged) data in this paper are detrended by
using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 for
quarterly data and of 129600 for monthly data following Ravn & Uhlig (2002).
When necessary, monthly empirical series are converted to quarterly frequency
by using a quarterly average except for the job finding rate and the job destruc-
tion rate whose quarterly series are obtained by iterating the law of motion for
unemployment. The range of data (unless stated otherwise) is from January
1948 to June 2014. All series are seasonally adjusted.
A.1 Unemployment
Monthly data on unemployment level and labour force level are obtained from
the Current Population Survey (CPS) provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS), U.S. Department of Labor, from January 1948 to June 2014.26 They do
not include persons marginally attached to the labour force. The ratio of these
two series forms the official definition of unemployment rate (‘U3’ as labelled
by BLS).
A.2 Output and Labour Productivity
For output, I use the quarterly real GDP series provided by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (BEA), U.S. Department of Commerce, and I use the BLS
quarterly series for non-farm output per job to represent the labour productiv-
ity.27
A.3 Transition Rates
I obtain the monthly job finding rates and job destruction rates as is done in
Shimer (2005) without correcting for time aggregation bias.28 As converting
26The series IDs are respectively LNS13000000 and LNS11000000.
27The series ID for labour productivity is PRS85006163.
28By correcting for the time aggregation bias, the destruction rates will be higher and closer
to the BLS data. However, since Shimer (2005)’s correction means a newly unemployed worker
has on average half a month to find a new job before being recorded as unemployed, one must
also adjust the Bellman equations in a discrete-time model accordingly, otherwise the implied
unemployment will be too high when the model period is longer than half a month.
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the monthly turnover rates to quarterly ones by simply computing a quarterly
average would overestimate the job finding rates and underestimate the job de-
struction rates, one should iterate the law of motion for monthly unemployment
(umot ) instead.
umot+1 = (1−ρmof ,t )umot +ρmox,t (1−umot ) (10)
umot+2 = (1−ρmof ,t+1)umot+1+ρmox,t+1(1−umot+1) (11)
umot+3 = (1−ρmof ,t+2)umot+2+ρmox,t+2(1−umot+2) (12)
where ρmof ,t and ρ
mo
x,t are respectively the monthly job finding and destruction
rates at time t. Replacing umot+2 in (12) with u
mo
t using (10) and (11) and setting
uqt+1 ≡ umot+3 and uqt ≡ umot , one can obtain29
uqt+1 = (1−ρqf ,t)uqt +ρqx,t(1−uqt ) (13)
where
ρqx,t = ρmox,t+2+ρ
mo
x,t+1(1−ρmox,t+2−ρmof ,t+2)
+ρmox,t (1−ρmox,t+1−ρmof ,t+1)(1−ρmox,t+2−ρmof ,t+2) (14)
ρqf ,t = 1−ρx,t−
2
∏
i=0
(1−ρmox,t+i−ρmof ,t+i) (15)
A.4 UI Duration Policy
Data on UI extensions in the U.S. are provided by Employment and Train-
ing Administration (ETA), U.S. Department of Labor, which collects and sum-
marises the Federal Unemployment Compensation Laws dating back to August
1935. There are 3 main types of UI durations: (i) the standard UI duration of 26
weeks, (ii) the automatic extension programme that is triggered by the state un-
employment rate (either total, insured or both) called “Extended Benefits (EB)”
programme which extends UI further by 13-20 weeks and (iii) the ad-hoc pro-
grammes that are often issued in the recessions and also triggered by the state
29We could also obtain the quarterly series of unemployment rates by collecting the first
monthly unemployment rate of every quarter as in Robin (2011) instead of averaging every 3
months. This does not change significantly the statistics reported in this paper.
33
unemployment rate providing additional UI ranging from 13 to 53 weeks.30 The
maximum duration of unemployment benefits in the U.S. is shown chronologi-
cally in Figure 3 where I sum together all types of UI durations. Apart from the
early 1980’s recessions, the extended UI duration has been steadily increasing
throughout the 1948-2014 period with its highest level at 99 weeks during the
Great Recession.
B Expressions for Optimal Search Intensity and
Match Surplus
Given the Bellman equations for the three types of workers {e,UI,UU}, we
can take the first derivative to find the optimal search effort for these workers.
The first order conditions are as follows
ν ′e(s
e(m;ω)) = −β (1−δ )M(1,θ(ω))Eω ′|ω
[
... (16)
(1−λ )(1−F(m))
(
WSe+(m;ω ′)−Em′|m′>m[WSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+ λEm′
[
(1−F(m′))(WSe+(m′;ω ′)−Em′′|m′′>m′[WSe+(m′′;ω ′)])
]]
ν ′u(s
UI(ω)) = βM(1,θ(ω))×
Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUI(m′;ω ′),0}−ξ (1−φ)US(ω ′)
]
(17)
ν ′u(s
UU(ω)) = βM(1,θ(ω))Em′ω ′|ω
[
max{WSUU(m′;ω ′),0}
]
(18)
where ν ′i (s) = ai(1+di)sdi; i ∈ {e,u}.
The surplus from being insured (as opposed to uninsured) of unemployed
workers is defined as
US(ω) ≡ UUI(ω)−UUU(ω).
The expressions for the total surpluses of worker-firm matches given the
workers’ previous employment statuses (e,UI,UU) and the surplus of being
30For a more detailed account, see the ETA website. Appendix B of Mitman and Rabinovich
(2014) also provides a good summary.
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insured unemployed are respectively:
Se(m;ω) = ymZ−νe(se(m;ω))− τ− (1−ψ)(b+h−νu(sUI(ω)))
−ψ(h−νu(sUU(ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se+(m;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se+(m′;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−ψ)pUI(ω)Em′[µSUI+(m′;ω ′)]
−ψ pUU(ω)Em′[µSUU+(m′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)
(
φ + pUI(ω)(1−φ)ξ
)
US(ω ′)
]
SUI(m;ω) = ymZ−νe(se(m;ω))− τ− (1−φ)(1−ξ )(b+hνu(sUI(ω)))
−(1− (1−φ)(1−ξ ))(h−νu(sUU(ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se+(m;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se+(m′;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′[µSe+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
−(1−φ)(1−ξ )pUI(ω)Em′[µSUI+(m′;ω ′)]
−
(
1− (1−φ)(1−ξ )
)
pUU(ω)Em′[µSUU+(m′;ω ′)]
+
(
1−ψ− (1−φ)2(1−ξ )(1−ξ pUI(ω))
)
US(ω ′)
]
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SUU(m;ω) = ymZ−νe(se(m;ω))− τ− (h−νu(sUU(ω)))+βEω ′|ω
[
...
(1−δ )(1−λ )
(
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m)))Se+(m;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m))Em′|m′>m[µSe+(m′;ω ′)]
)
+(1−δ )λEm′
[
(1− pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′)))Se+(m′;ω ′)...
+pe(m;ω)(1−F(m′))Em′′|m′′>m′ [µSe+(m′′;ω ′)]
]
−pUU(ω)Em′[µSUU+(m′;ω ′)]
+(1−ψ)US(ω ′)
]
US(ω) = b−νu(sUI(ω))+νu(sUU(ω))
+βEω ′|ω
[
pUI(ω)µEm′[SUI+(m′;ω ′)]− pUU(ω)µEm′[SUU+(m′;ω ′)]
(1−φ)
(
1−ξ pUI(ω)
)
US(ω ′)
]
C Transitions
Employment The mass of employed agents in t with match quality m, em,t ,
evolves as follows
em,t+1 =
(
(1−δ )(1−λ )(1− pem,t+ pem,tF(m))em,t
+(1−δ )(1−λ ) f (m)
∫
m′<m
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
+(1−δ )λ f (m)
∫
m′
(1− pem′,t+ pem′,tF(m))em′,tdm′
+(1−δ )λF(m) f (m)
∫
m′
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
)
1{Sem,t+1 > 0}
+ f (m)(uUIt p
UI
t )1{SUIm,t+1 > 0}
+ f (m)(uUUt p
UU
t )1{SUUm,t+1 > 0} (19)
where 1{·} is an indicator function. The total employment is the sum of all
employed workers over the match qualities et =
∫
em,t dm, and the aggregate
output can be computed as yt = zt
∫
m · em,t dm.
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Job Destructions The job destruction rate of employed workers of type m and
the average job destruction rate are respectively
ρx,t(m) =
δ if Sem,t+1 > 0,1 otherwise
ρx,t =
δ
∫
{m:Sem,t+1>0} e
post
m,t dm+
∫
{m:Sem,t+1≤0} e
post
m,t dm
et
where epostm,t = (1−λ )(1− pem,t+ pem,tF(m))em,t
+(1−λ ) f (m)
∫
m′<m
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
+λ f (m)
∫
m′
(1− pem′,t+ pem′,tF(m))em′,tdm′
+λF(m) f (m)
∫
m′
pem′,tem′,tdm
′
denotes employed workers with match productivity m at the end of the period t.
Job Findings The job finding rate for an unemployed worker of type i =
{UI,UU} and the average job finding rate are respectively
ρ if ,t =
∫
ρ if ,t(m) f (m)dm
ρ f ,t =
uUIt ρUIf ,t +u
UU
t ρUUf ,t
uUIt +uUUt
where ρ if ,t(m) =
pit if Sim,t+1 > 0,0 otherwise
Job-to-job Transitions The match-specific and the average job-to-job transi-
tion rates are respectively
ρeem,t = (1−δ )
(
(1−λ )pem,t(1−F(m))Em′>m[1{Sem′,t+1 > 0}]
+λ
∫
m′
pem,t f (m
′)(1−F(m′))Em′′>m′[1{Sem′′,t+1 > 0}]dm′
)
ρeet =
∫
mρeem,tem,tdm
et
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Unemployment The mass of unemployed workers with and without UI ben-
efits as well as the total unemployment evolves respectively as follows
uUIt+1 = (1−φt)(1− pUIt )uUIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, not losing UI
+χUIt (1−φt)(1−ξ )pUIt uUIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, not losing UI
+ (1−ψ)ρx,tet︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, not losing UI
(20)
uUUt+1 = φt(1− pUIt )uUIt︸ ︷︷ ︸
unmatched, losing UI
+χUIt
(
φt+(1−φt)ξ
)
pUIt u
UI
t︸ ︷︷ ︸
bad match, losing UI
+(1−ρUUf ,t )uUUt + ψρx,tet︸ ︷︷ ︸
destroyed match, losing UI
(21)
ut+1 = uUIt+1+u
UU
t+1 (22)
where χUIt ≡
∫
1{SUIm,t+1 ≤ 0} f (m)dm denotes the probability that the newly
formed match between a firm and an insured unemployed worker is not viable.
D Performance of the Approximation Method
Below I report the average percentage deviations (in absolute value) of the
1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th moments of the approximated distribution of employed
workers over the match quality from the distributions obtained from the simula-
tion. The method described in the Model section delivers distributions that are
less than 1% different in terms of the 1st, 2nd and 4th moments from the actual
distributions found in the simulation. However it generates the 3rd moment that
is more than 3% different from its counterpart since the skewness is more sen-
sitive to the cut-offs in the distributions coming from endogenous destructions.
Table 1: Performance of the Approximation Method
Percentage deviation (%) Mean S.E.
1st moment 0.5650 0.3953
2nd moment 0.4670 0.4499
3rd moment 3.6819 3.4767
4th moment 0.2009 0.2936
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Table 2: Pre-specified Parameters For Baseline Model (Monthly)
Parameter Description Value Source/Remarks
β Discount factor 0.9967 Annual interest rate of 4%
κ Vacancy posting cost 0.0392 Fujita & Ramey (2012)
µ Worker’s bargaining power 0.5 Den Haan, Ramey & Watson (2000)
φH UI exhaustion rate 1/6 6 months max UI duration, ETA
φL,I UI exhaustion rate 1/12 12 months max UI duration, ETA
φL,II UI exhaustion rate 1/18 18 months max UI duration, ETA
b UI benefit 0.1302 Gruber (1997) given E(w) = 0.93
h Leisure flow 0.7068 Gruber (1997) given E(w) = 0.93
u¯ UI policy threshold 0.06 ETA
au Search cost function 0.1291 Normalisation
du,de Search cost function 1 Christensen et al. (2004), Yashiv (2000)
Additional parameters for the version with the Great Moderation
σz,pre85 SD of TFP shocks 0.0070 BLS and author’s own calculation
σz,post85 SD of TFP shocks 0.0490 BLS and author’s own calculation
Table 3: Calibrated Parameters For Baseline Model (Monthly)
Parameter Description Value
l Matching function 0.5346
δ Exogenous destruction 0.0239
λ Redrawing new m 0.5000
ψ Losing UI after becoming unemp. 0.4900
ξ Losing UI after meeting firm 0.4605
ae Search cost function 0.1430
m Lowest match-specific prod. 0.4621
β1 Match-specific prod. distribution 2.9646
β2 Match-specific prod. distribution 4.4546
ρz Persistence of TFP 0.9724
σz Standard deviation of TFP shocks 0.0061
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Table 4: Targeted Moments
Moment Data Baseline Model Great Moderation µ = 0.7
E(u) 0.0583 0.0564 0.0567 0.0634
(0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0051)
E(ρ f ) 0.4194 0.4387 0.4611 0.4335
(0.0194) (0.0209) (0.0166)
E(ρx) 0.0248 0.0256 0.0256 0.0274
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0009)
E(ρee) 0.0320 0.0317 0.0317 0.0316
(0.0004) (0.0003) (0.0003)
E(udur) (weeks) 15.4287 12.3667 11.8921 12.0494
(1.3213) (1.4983) (0.8769)
E(uUI/u) 0.0290 0.0331 0.0332 0.0358
(0.0038) (0.0042) (0.0038)
std(u) 0.1454 0.1637 0.1717 0.1765
(0.0229) (0.0259) (0.0158)
std(ρ f ) 0.0999 0.1207 0.1290 0.1149
(0.0144) (0.0159) (0.009)
std(ρx) 0.0890 0.0836 0.0772 0.0952
(0.0158) (0.018) (0.0115)
std(LP) 0.0131 0.0124 0.0122 0.0120
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005)
corr(LP,LP−1) 0.7612 0.7660 0.7656 0.7626
(0.0196) (0.0201) (0.0192)
corr(y,LP)pre85 0.7015 0.7620 0.7272 0.7567
(0.0958) (0.1273) (0.0954)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Table 5: Moments Not Targeted
Moment Data Baseline Model Moment Data Baseline Model
std(udur) (weeks) 6.9941 5.3255 corr(y,ρ f )pre85 0.8788 0.9282
(2.5117) (0.0323)
std(uUI) 0.1657 0.2136 corr(y,ρ f )post85 0.8691 0.8337
(0.0271) (0.0633)
std(v) 0.1408 0.0781 corr(y,ρx)pre85 -0.8493 -0.7568
(0.0044) (0.0549)
std(u)/std(y) 8.7921 7.2199 corr(y,ρx)post85 -0.8098 -0.7417
(38.7559) (0.0451)
std(e)/std(y) 0.5412 0.6566 corr(y,u)pre85 -0.8831 -0.9084
(3.754) (0.0218)
std(w)/std(y) 0.3878 0.5167 corr(y,u)post85 -0.8915 -0.8946
(3.0179) (0.0395)
corr(y,ρ f ) 0.8009 0.9118 corr(y,v)pre85 0.8981 0.6655
(0.0291) (0.1011)
corr(y,ρx) -0.8414 -0.7873 corr(y,v)post85 0.8693 0.5
(0.0385) (0.0873)
corr(y,u) -0.8825 -0.8914 E(m)pre85 - 0.8874
(0.0191) (0.0003)
corr(y,v) 0.8850 0.6253 E(m)post85 - 0.8884
(0.0821) (0.0006)
corr(LP,θ ) 0.703 0.8740 corr(LP,u) -0.633 -0.5932
(0.0334) (0.0351)
corr(u,v) -0.8786 -0.3638 corr(LP,v) 0.719 0.8823
(0.0465) (0.0313)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Empirical data on corr(LP,·) are from Hagedorn and
Manovskii (2011).
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Table 6: Correlation Between Output (y) and Labour Productivity (LP)
Data Baseline Model Great Moderation µ = 0.7
corr(y,LP) 0.6186 0.6553 0.6718 0.6569
(0.0991) (0.1027) (0.0980)
corr(y,LP)pre85 0.7015 0.7620 0.7272 0.7567
(0.0958) (0.1273) (0.0954)
corr(y,LP)post85 0.2954 0.5911 0.6128 0.6106
(0.1201) (0.118) (0.1173)
∆corr(y,LP) 0.4061 0.1709 0.1144 0.1461
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7: Decomposition of UI Effects on corr(y,LP)
Data Baseline Model S-fixed s-fixed
corr(y,LP) 0.6186 0.6553 0.7275 0.7165
(0.0991) (0.072) (0.1274)
corr(y,LP)pre85 0.7015 0.7620 0.7801 0.7920
(0.0958) (0.0852) (0.1081)
corr(y,LP)post85 0.2954 0.5911 0.6955 0.6920
(0.1201) (0.08) (0.1461)
∆corr(y,LP) 0.4061 0.1709 0.0846 0.1000
Note: S-fixed (s-fixed) denotes the case where the match surplus (job search effort) is
fixed to the pre-1985 period throughout the simulation. Standard errors are in parenthe-
ses.
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Figure 1: Correlations between output and output per worker for 1948Q1-
1985Q1 and 1985Q2-2014Q2 (both variables are of quarterly frequency and
detrended using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600) (the green
lines are linear fitted trends) (Source: BEA and BLS)
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Figure 2: Rolling Correlation Coefficients between output and output per worker
from 1948Q1 (up until 2014Q2) (both variables are of quarterly frequency and
detrended using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 1,600) (shaded
areas denote recessions) (Source: BEA and BLS)
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Figure 3: Maximum UI duration (in weeks) as plotted as against time periods
from 1948Q1 to 2014Q2 (shaded areas denote recessions) (Source: ETA)
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Figure 4: Total match surpluses Si; i ∈ {e,UI,UU} plotted against unemploy-
ment rate (u): For the match-specific and total factor productivities at the middle
nodes
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Figure 5: Conditional job finding rates (worker’s meeting rates) by employment
statuses plotted against unemployment rate: For the match-specific and total
factor productivities at the middle nodes
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Figure 6: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) detrended series of
main variables
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Figure 7: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) raw series of main
variables
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Figure 8: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) detrended series of
insured unemployment rate
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Figure 9: Model-generated (solid) and empirical (dashed) raw series of insured
unemployment rate
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Figure 10: IRF of 1% Negative TFP Shock
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Figure 11: IRF of 2% Negative TFP Shock
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Figure 12: Duration-dependent Job Finding Probability (implied UI durations
in parentheses)
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